– Austausch über Prävention, Rückkehr und die Stimme der Angehörigen

Wie umgehen mit Rückkehrerinnen, Radikalisierung und der Sprachlosigkeit in Familien?
Beim Besuch von Lamya Kaddor tauschten wir uns über aktuelle Herausforderungen in der Islamismusprävention, die Radikalisierung Jugendlicher über soziale Medien und die oft überhörten Stimmen betroffener Angehöriger aus. Einblicke in unsere Arbeit – und ein Plädoyer für mehr Menschlichkeit und Differenzierung.

Einblicke in die Praxis der Präventionsarbeit

Anfang Juli hatten wir beim Verein Grüner Vogel e.V. die Gelegenheit, Lamya Kaddor – Bundestagsabgeordnete, Islamwissenschaftlerin und langjährige Akteurin in der Präventionsarbeit – bei uns zu begrüßen. Im Mittelpunkt des Besuchs stand der Austausch über unsere Erfahrungen in der Islamismusprävention und Deradikalisierung sowie über die Herausforderungen im Umgang mit Rückkehrer*innen aus jihadistischen Kontexten.

Menschen im Mittelpunkt – nicht nur Fälle

Als Verein arbeiten wir mit Menschen, die von islamistischer Radikalisierung betroffen oder gefährdet sind – unabhängig von Geschlecht oder Alter. In den letzten Jahren haben wir insbesondere viele Frauen und ihre Kinder auf dem Weg der Reintegration begleitet. Die Rückkehr aus jihadistischen Strukturen, oft aus Kriegs- und Krisengebieten, ist mit zahlreichen Herausforderungen verbunden – rechtlich, sozial und emotional. Unser Fokus liegt auf individueller Beratung, psychosozialer Stabilisierung, Begleitung im Alltag sowie auf langfristiger Unterstützung in Bildungs- und Familienkontexten. Gleichzeitig bringen wir auch Erfahrungen aus der Arbeit mit männlichen Rückkehrern und radikalisierten Jugendlichen ein.

Influencer, Ideologien, Ideale – Radikalisierung im digitalen Raum

Kaddor interessierte sich auch für aktuelle Entwicklungen im Bereich der Radikalisierung und Rekrutierung von Jugendlichen, insbesondere über soziale Medien. Unsere Mitarbeitenden berichteten von beunruhigenden Trends und der zunehmenden Bedeutung von religiösen Influencern, Predigern und bestimmten Subkulturen, in denen Männlichkeitsbilder, Kampfsport und Gewaltverherrlichung ineinandergreifen. Die größte Herausforderung sehen wir aktuell in der frühen Radikalisierung von Minderjährigen, die über Plattformen wie TikTok, Instagram oder Telegram mit extremistischen Inhalten in Kontakt kommen. Hier braucht es dringend mehr Prävention, digitale Aufklärung und interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit.

Zwischen Sorge und Strafverfolgung – Stimmen der Angehörigen

Ein wichtiger Teil des Besuchs war das Gespräch mit Angehörigen, die sich in einem offenen Brief an uns und die Öffentlichkeit gewandt hatten. In eindrücklichen Worten schildern sie ihre Überforderung, die Isolation und den belastenden Zustand der Ungewissheit: Ihre Angehörigen befinden sich in Gefängnissen in Nordostsyrien – Orte, zu denen internationale Organisationen wie das Internationale Rote Kreuz keinen Zugang haben. Seit Jahren haben die Familien keinen Kontakt zu ihren Angehörigen. Viele wissen nicht, ob ihre Verwandten gesund sind oder ob sie überhaupt noch leben. Trotz dieser Situation betonen sie ihren Wunsch nach einer strafrechtlichen Aufarbeitung – verbunden mit dem Bedürfnis nach Information, Kontakt und einem menschenwürdigen Umgang.

Lamya Kaddor zeigte im Gespräch großes Verständnis für die schwierige Lage der Familien. Sie hob hervor, dass rechtsstaatliche Verfahren und humanitäre Verantwortung keine Gegensätze sein dürfen. Ein differenzierter Umgang mit Rückkehrer*innen erfordert aus ihrer Sicht sowohl sicherheitsbezogene Maßnahmen als auch soziale und gesellschaftliche Perspektiven: „Eine geregelte und geordnete Rückkehr liegt auch in unserem eigenen Sicherheitsinteresse, um einem Ausbruch aus den Gefangenenlagern vorzubeugen und eine gesicherte Rückführung, Verurteilung und Integration zu gewährleisten. Wir haben eine Verantwortung, die Syrerinnen und Syrer mit der Herausforderung nicht alleine zu lassen.“

Für uns als Grüner Vogel e.V. war dieser Besuch eine wichtige Möglichkeit, unsere praktischen Erfahrungen mit der politischen Ebene zu teilen. Wir danken Lamya Kaddor für ihr Interesse an unserer Arbeit und den Angehörigen für ihr Vertrauen und ihren offenen Austausch. Ihre Stimmen verdeutlichen, wie wichtig es ist, Menschen nicht auf ihre Vergangenheit zu reduzieren – sondern ihnen auch in schwierigen Situationen mit Klarheit, Verantwortung und Respekt zu begegnen.

When extremism intersects with organized crime, a dangerous web of ideology, power, and profit emerges. Across many European regions, the boundaries between political radicals and professional criminals are increasingly blurred – with serious consequences for society and security. This article explains how these alliances take shape, why prisons, youth centers, and digital spaces become key hubs, and which strategies could effectively counter these developments. It is a call for greater networking, prevention, and political foresight.

Introduction

The second meeting of the EU Knowledge Hub’s Thematic Panel 1 (“Ideologies and Conspiracy Narratives”) took place on 12–13 June 2025 in Aalborg, Denmark. The focus was the growing overlap between organized crime (OC) and violent extremism – a phenomenon that not only challenges Europe’s security structures but also affects social cohesion and local resilience.
The so-called crime-terror nexus manifests in many forms: shared networks in drug or arms trafficking, common financial structures, and the ideological framing of criminal activities. This hybrid field is not ideologically one-sided; it ranges from right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism to ethno-nationalist or otherwise ideologically ambivalent groups. The meeting brought together experts from security agencies, civil society, research, and practice to better understand this complex web and to develop joint prevention strategies.

Crime-Terror Nexus

This strategic alliance between ideological and criminal milieus is no longer marginal. Instead, it now shows up across many ideological contexts. For instance, far-right brotherhoods team up with biker gangs. Likewise, Salafist networks copy mafia-style structures. Moreover, criminal links also surface inside left-wing or ethno-nationalist movements. What unites all these actors is a remarkable strategic flexibility. They move fast, operate transnationally, and adapt quickly. They act both online and on the street. Meanwhile, they lure young people through social media, music, and violence-glorifying visuals.

Prisons, however, are especially critical arenas. Inside, extremist and criminal actors meet and recruit each other. They swap know-how. Consequently, they forge alliances that outlive the prison term. Thus, these encounters are not isolated incidents. Rather, they reflect a deeper pattern.

The key question, therefore, is how ideological, economic, and territorial interests mix inside such hybrid constellations. It is now clear that the old line between extremist and criminal actors is fading. Extremist groups tap criminal infrastructure for money, mobilisation, and power. Conversely, criminal groups deploy ideological narratives to win loyalty, mimic legitimacy, and control social spaces.

Nevertheless, the crime-terror nexus is not always a stable alliance. Often it is opportunistic, situational, or simply pragmatic. This point becomes evident in case studies. For example, right-wing brotherhoods link up with outlaw motorcycle gangs. They share business models and violence even though their ideologies differ. A comparable mechanism also appears in Islamist circles. There, religious narratives merge deliberately with economic hardship and social marginalisation.

Key Findings

1. Identifying and Analyzing Hybrid Structures
   The groups studied can no longer be neatly categorized as either ideological or criminal. They are mixed forms with reciprocal dynamics – in identities and in organizational structures – which sets new requirements for analysis, surveillance, and intervention.
2. Blind Spots in Justice, Administration, and Prevention
   The intertwining of OC and extremism is most evident in prisons, where the correctional system often acts as a catalyst for new alliances. Specialized personnel, context-sensitive intervention programs, and inter-institutional cooperation are largely lacking. Similar knowledge gaps exist in schools, youth work, and municipal administration.
3. Ideology as a Strategic Tool
   Ideology functions not only as a mobilizing element but also as a resource for self-positioning, public image, and symbolic legitimation. In practice, it can be fluid and interchangeable – adapted to a group’s needs. This functional view of ideology calls for new approaches in prevention and strategic communication.
4. Transnational Networks and European Responsibility
   Crime–Terror Nexus is not local. Case studies show how right-wing networks in Germany link with OMCGs in Scandinavia, or how Islamist groups finance themselves through diaspora communities across several EU member states. Cross-border cooperation is therefore essential – in security architecture and in prevention.

Risks, Blind Spots, and Strategic Gaps

A central concern is how to craft legal, political, and operational responses to hybrid actors. They cannot be contained by traditional extremism-prevention measures or by classic OC-fighting instruments alone. The lack of coherent legal frameworks complicates prosecution of groups whose activities may fall under both extremist suspicion and organized crime.

Equally challenging is dealing with young people who move in the gray zone between ideology and crime. Many are burdened by multiple disadvantages – social deprivation, personal experiences of violence, and unstable family or school ties – and are specifically targeted by hybrid groups promising belonging, protection, and recognition.

Institutional structures are often fragmented: police, social work, educational institutions, and local administrations operate side by side rather than together. This missing coordination prevents detection of overlapping networks and hampers coherent responses. Current, fine-grained situational pictures are lacking at the municipal level, particularly in neighborhoods under informal control by criminal-extremist groups, where fear and silence prevail and democratic participation erodes.

Sensational or romanticized media portrayals of “underground rebels” can further increase the appeal of extremist-criminal lifestyles. Gender-specific perspectives are also frequently neglected – despite women acting as protagonists or facing distinct vulnerabilities in these structures.

What Is to Be Done? Developing Integrated Strategies

In response to these dynamics, several strategies were discussed:

• Multi-sector Task Forces
  Setting up specialized units at municipal, national, and European levels that link security agencies, justice, social services, education, and civil-society actors is seen as essential.
• Prevention Work in Prisons
  Prisons are not only sites of punishment but also environments for radicalization and networking. Exit programs, psychosocial counseling, and culturally sensitive education are needed here.
• Digital Strategies
  Hybrid groups increasingly use encrypted platforms, cryptocurrencies, and digital propaganda formats. Media-literacy education and digital awareness campaigns are crucial countermeasures.
• Victim-Centered Approaches
  People affected by violence and intimidation from hybrid groups need structural protection, access to legal remedies, and support in rebuilding their life prospects.

Conclusion: Understanding Radicalization, Taking Complexity Seriously

Discussions in Aalborg showed that the boundaries between extremism and organized crime are dissolving. Hybrid structures are emerging that operate in social spaces, build economic power, and employ ideological frameworks – creating new challenges for prevention, intervention, and law enforcement. A cross-sector, European-coordinated strategy is therefore indispensable.

Instead of continuing with disciplinarily separated tools, we need a shared analysis platform, legally grounded task forces, and social policies aimed at resilience and justice. The panel’s recommendations provide an initial guide – their implementation will determine the effectiveness of future European P/CVE strategies.

The conclusions paper from the EUKH thematic panel provides solid insights, identifies blind spots, and offers concrete recommendations. It is a contribution to a necessary strategic learning process – in Europe and beyond.

S. O'Keeffe, I. Pérez Pérez, F. Wichmann, V. Theofilopoulos (2025): The Nexus Between Organised Crime and Extremism: How Ideologies and Conspiracy Theories Fuel the Symbiotic Relationship Between Organised Crime and Extremism. Meeting of Thematic Panel 1: Ideologies & Conspiracy Narratives. Conclusions Paper (Download).

Society’s engagement with Islamist movements faces complex challenges: these concern not only security but also social cohesion. The recently published long-form version (only German) of the Task Force on Preventing Islamist Radicalisation recommendations now presents concrete proposals for contemporary, sustainable prevention work. Claudia Dantschke, founder of Grüner Vogel e.V., helped draft the recommendations.

Radicalisation prevention needs nuanced answers

The Task Force stresses that prevention must not be one-dimensional. In particular, mainstream systems such as schools and youth services require greater staffing and financial resources to act preventively. Other central proposals include:

• expanding psychosocial support in the context of migration and asylum,
• monitoring radicalisation trajectories, and
• building reliable knowledge networks linking practice, research and authorities.

Focus on online prevention

A special emphasis falls on the digital dimension of Islamism: social media, messaging apps and gaming platforms are increasingly used as spaces for radicalisation. The Task Force therefore calls for:

• a legally anchored age limit of 16 for social platforms,
• consistent removal of anti-democratic content,
• a legal obligation for platforms to make prevention services visible, and
• the creation of a nationwide knowledge portal and a teaching/learning platform for professionals.

The aim is to strengthen professional online prevention and provide better support for affected individuals, relatives, counsellors and multipliers.

Holistic case management

The recommendations also demand improved cooperation among security agencies, youth services, educational institutions and civil-society organisations. Only robust, multi-professional case management can act preventively and de-escalate – especially when dealing with suspected cases of radicalisation.

Full version available

The complete long-form version of the Task Force on Preventing Islamist Radicalisation recommendations can now be downloaded. It offers detailed insights into the experts’ analyses, rationales and proposed measures—including contributions from Claudia Dantschke, who drew on her many years of experience in civil-society prevention work.

Download (PDF)

Grüner Vogel e.V. continues to advocate for differentiated, human-rights-oriented and professional Islamism prevention—both offline and online. The Task Force recommendations provide an important foundation for this work.

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Member of the Task Force on Preventing Islamist Radicalisation 

Lisa Borchardt (Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen), Claudia Dantschke (Grüner Vogel e.V.), Florian Endres (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) Dominik Irani (Bayerisches Landeskriminalamt), Julian Junk (PRIF Peace Research Institute Frankfurt), Thomas Mücke (Violence Prevention Network gGmbH), Michael Kiefer (Universität Osnabrück), Mouhanad Khorchide (Universität Münster) und Jamuna Oehlmann (BAG RelEx).